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Syria, Iraq, Ebola, Gaza, Mali – there has been a huge increase in the number of tragic crisesin recent months… The humanitarian sector is under enormous pressure. This litany of tra-gedies is further cause for us to focus on the quality of assistance and protection operationsfor civilians. It also raises questions about the capacity and role of a sector which remainsvital, but is increasingly in danger.This situation has led to a relatively eclectic issue of Humanitarian Aid on the Move, whichcovers a broad range of issues. Understanding the importance of IHL, the complexity of situa-tions, and the “turbulence to come”   all depends on collective intelligence. Major health riskshave emerged in the last ten years. The Ebola crisis shows how our societies have becomemore vulnerable, but also more reactive. Faced with the risk that it will spread to the rest ofthe world, our collective capacities will be put to the test.How do we control this turbulence and violence which seem to be key factors of the future?How do we make societies more resilient, with the redefinition of the Hyogo Framework forAction (Sendai, March 2015) and the COP21 (Paris 2015), where we hope to see a globalagreement on the climate? How do we rethink the humanitarian sector of the future, as theWorld Humanitarian Summit of 2016 invites us to do? The following articles, written byhumanitarians and operational researchers, aim to contribute to these global discussionsbased on field practices and analysis.
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Working in a prison in Myanmar: Médecins Sans Frontières’
experience working in Insein prison
Working in a prison for a humanitarian organisation
is not easy, particularly because of the specific
characteristics of such places. Médecins Sans
Frontières’ experience working in Insein prison
illustrates the difficulties of achieving objectives
both in terms of results (long term provision of
appropriate and full medical care to patients) and
working conditions (minimal manipulation,
indiscriminate access to patients, etc.).
Jean-Marc Biquet
There is not a lot of literature about humanitarian actionin prisons, which tends to imply that it is not very com-mon: not all NGOs who want to work in prisons are ableto and, in theory, information about what happens insideis not available to the public.The situation is paradoxical, with prisoners among theleast susceptible to be provided with external aid whenthis is needed. Excluded from society for what they have done or whatthey think, prisoners’ well-being is totally dependent onthe goodwill of the authorities. If there is a disastroushealth situation, this is often the result of voluntary negli-gence: security is the main, if not only, preoccupation ofthe authorities. Providing basic services such as food,hygiene, health and protecting prisoners’ rights, in a waythat guarantees dignity, is of secondary importance, aswas reported by Manfred Nowak in 2010 (who was theUN Special Rapporteur on torture at the time), after four
years spent visiting a large number of prisons throughoutthe world1.One of the reasons that there are so few assistance pro-jects in prisons is no doubt the difficulties linked to theconditions in which action can take place: what can bedone in a prison depends completely on the authoritiesand this is either imposed by them or is the object of verytough negotiations. Indeed, all the problems which canexist in any humanitarian project can also exist in prison,but more intensely than elsewhere (risks of manipulation,of collusion, of a lack of implication by the beneficiaries,violation of independence and impartiality, security pro-blems, etc.).Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has some experience ofworking in prisons bringing vital assistance to inmates inresponse to a medical emergency (cholera, famine, etc.).Sometimes the organisation takes the initiative of propo-sing a healthcare programme for inmates with a chronicdisease who have not had access to full healthcare fromthe authorities in charge (tuberculosis, AIDS, etc.)2. Thesecases involve longer-term programmes to deal with thesepublic health problems. MSF’s experience in Myanmar is an example of this type ofsituation and the difficulties of achieving objectives bothin terms of results (patients being provided with appro-priate and full healthcare in the long term) and workingconditions (minimal manipulation, indiscriminate accessto patients in need…).
16 See Increasing respect for IHL in NIACs, ICRC, op.cit. See also, “How doeslaw protect in war?”, Part 1, Chapter 15, pp.1 to 13.  17 IASC commitment.18 Quality and accountability initiatives like the Sphere project, Groupe URD’sQuality Compas project and the ALNAP network are all currently going inthe direction of greater protection. One can also refer to the HumanitarianAccountability Partnership (HAP International), the Listening Project, theInternational Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), and the En-
hanced Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance initiative. See also“Growing the shelter tree, protecting rights through humanitarian action”, Uni-ted Nations Inter Agency Standing Committee, 2002. See also Action AgainstHunger “Humanitarian principles in conflict” (http://dd0jh6c2fb2ci.cloud-front.net/sites/default/files/publications/Humanitarian_principles_in_conflict_Ensuring_humanitarian_principles_are_respected_in_armed_conflicts_and_other_situations_of_violence_ACFs_experience_and_position_12.2013.pdf). 19 National Human Rights Commission, avis sur un projet d’institution d’un
médiateur humanitaire, 27 January 2000, http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/de-fault/files/00.01.27_avis_projet_institution_mediateur_humanitaire.pdf20 ICRC, “How does law protect in war ?”, op.cit.21 “The Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action”, op.cit., p.p 1-2. 22 See The protection of Human Rights in Humanitarian crises, A Joint Back-ground Paper by OHCHR and UNHCR, op.cit. To make up for these shortco-mings, the IASC commissioned an independent study in order to evaluatethe extent to which the humanitarian system was able to ensure protectionand establish the measures that needed to be put in place in order to gua-rantee that protection effectively had a central place within this system.
23 National Human Rights Commission, avis sur un projet d’institution d’un
médiateur humanitaire, op.cit.24 See United Nations General Assembly, 67th session, AG11328,http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2012/AG11328.doc.htm25 Though it may seem inappropriate to compare the responsibilities of anNGO with those of a company, we can learn a lot from doing so. The UnitedNations are increasingly looking into this issue and national tribunals are in-creasingly called upon to make decisions about this responsibility in connec-tion with legal proceedings instigated by human rights associations. SeeProtect, Respect and Remedy : a Framework for Business and Human Rights,Human Rights Council, 2008 and the Guiding Principles on Business andHuman Rights, OHCHR, 2011. See also Corporate Accountability for HumanRights Abuses : A Guide for Victims and NGOs on Recourse Mechanisms,http://www.fidh.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a8258.pdf26 French Penal Code, Article 113-6 and 121-2. 27 French Penal Code, Articles 222-19 to 222-21.  28 Action Against Hunger “Humanitarian principles in conflict”, op.cit., p.1529 International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporaryarmed conflicts, October 2011, CICR, op.cit. p.20.30 French Penal Code, Article 222-22. 
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A rare opportunityActing as a humanitarian organisation in Myanmar is verycomplicated. Though the situation in 2014 has somewhatevolved, when discussions began about the possibility ofMSF working in prisons (2008), there was a lack of trustbetween humanitarian organisations and the Burmeseauthorities: the regime, which was known to be one of thetoughest in the world until the dissolution of the junta in2011, was not at all happy about foreign humanitarianaction, particularly in the most sensitive regions. Humanitarian needs existed (conflict, poverty, poor healthservices3, climatic hazards4, etc.), but the working condi-tions that were imposed made it very difficult:administrative barriers and complications; access toconflict zones in the East of the country was virtuallyimpossible; discussions with the authorities were filteredby spokespersons from the Ministries who did not haveany decision-making power; prohibitive taxes on imports;attempts to control the local staff which led to endlessnegotiations and uncertain results; funding which was dif-ficult to obtain from funding agencies, etc.In addition to this, we should also mention the very strongsuspicion which was felt, at the time, by the Burmeseopposition in exile and in prison, as well as by certain cam-paigners around the world, who accused aid organisationsof playing into the hands of the dictatorship by takingaction in Myanmar5.The authorities had full powerover humanitarian action,without the criteria for deci-sions always being clear orunderstandable for aid orga-nisations. As a consequence,the need to accept compro-mises (some would say thesacrificing of principles) oftenled to very heated debateswithin humanitarian organi-sations6.In 2008 the Swiss office ofMSF in Yangon was unexpec-tedly approached, in anunofficial capacity, to work in Insein prison: Myanmar's
“silent killing field”7. Someone who had formerly been incharge of prisoners’ health contacted MSF to develop anAIDS programme for prisons. Up till then, nothing hadbeen done for infected patients. This person had alreadyseen and appreciated AIDS programmes run by MSF in dif-ferent regions of the country. According to the informationwe obtained, it was the deaths of political prisoners withAIDS that pushed the leaders of the junta to demand thatsomething was done so that this did not happen again.No foreign organisation had worked in prisons since20058.
Medical data supplied by the Burmese authorities showedthat AIDS and TB were the most common causes of mor-tality in prisons (27% of deaths in Insein prison in 2008were related to AIDS9) even though the number of deathshad already fallen since the national programme againstTB had begun to detect and provide treatment to patientswith pulmonary TB (smear positive).Insein prison, the biggest in the country, had between 6000 and 8 000 prisoners, some of whom were only in tran-sit, during their trial or before being transferred to a workcamp. In addition, 1/5 of the prisoners were women.According to the figures provided by the authorities, 30%of female prisoners who had worked in the sex industryhad AIDS (compared to 0.67% of the country’s populationas a whole). And the number of cases of TB was 25 timeshigher in prison than in the population as a whole (accor-ding to the World Health Organisation, there were 525cases for every 100 000 people in the general population).
A period of discussion and negotiationAt Médecins Sans Frontières, there were very heated dis-cussions about whether or not to seize this opportunity:should we, on principle, accept to collaborate with a dic-tatorship to assist a population, who clearly had needs, butwhose well-being was exclusively the responsibility of theauthorities? Would we help patients to get back on theirfeet only for the system to knock them back down again?Could we refuse to assist people living in deplorable condi-tions, in terms of health amongst otherthings, when MSF was created “to gowhere nobody else goes”10. Should we nottry to provide assistance with the risk thatwe might quickly give up (and perhapsdenounce an unacceptable situation)?The decision was made to begin negotia-tions while giving ourselves all the timethat was needed to achieve acceptableconditions for the project.During the negotiation phase, MSF enga-ged in discussions internally about theconditions that needed to be met beforewe would consider going ahead with theprogramme. As a result, we established akind of management chart which would help those incharge of the project to closely monitor the developmentof the negotiations and activities.The preconditions for launching and pursuing activitiesconcerned three areas: 
1) In terms of security: MSF refused to allow the presence of arms or any meansof restraint in its clinic. MSF staff, to be chosen by the orga-nisation alone, were not to be threatened or forced to takepart in acts which would be harmful for the health or well-being of the patients. Access to the clinic was to be
The authorities had full
power over humanitarian
action, without the criteria
for decisions always being
clear or understandable for
aid organisations. As a
consequence, the need to
accept compromises (some
would say the sacrificing of
principles) often led to
very heated debates within
humanitarian organisations
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guaranteed to MSF staff, whether foreign or Burmese.Patients were to have unrestricted and voluntary accessto the MSF clinic (common law prisoners and prisoners ofconscience) based on their need for treatment as deter-mined by the MSF staff or at the request of the patient ifthere was a problem.
2) In terms of healthcare procedures and protocols:The protocols were to be based on MSF’s quality criteria.Patient consultations were to be strictly confidential(consultation rooms and medical data). If necessary,patients could be referred to specialist institutions. 
3) In terms of project strategy:MSF would provide the prison authorities with support fora period of five years, if, during this period, the authoritiesdemonstrated the will to invest in prisoners’ healthbeyond AIDS in the form of shared management. Thisperiod was deemed to be long enough for capacity buil-ding and skills transfer before MSF withdrew. MSF, for itspart, made a commitment to find the human and materialresources necessary and guaranteed that it would supplyantiretroviral (ARV) and other medicine for patients recei-ving treatment, up to a year after the withdrawal of theorganisation, regardless of the reasons. To maximise the chances of success of this observationphase, Médecins Sans Frontières decided not to publicisethe negotiations or the possible launch of this new activity.Contacts were nevertheless established with the diasporato find out how medical work by MSF in a Burmese prisonmight be perceived. Two years of negotiations were needed before the twoparties felt sufficiently comfortable and MSF’s activitiesstarted in the prison. 
Implementation under strict surveillanceA letter of agreement was signed in August 2010 betweenthe prison authorities and Médecins Sans Frontièreswhich allowed collaboration to begin, treating prisonerswith AIDS. The letter specified that if the collaboration wasfruitful, other medical treatment could then be providedby MSF. Both parties observed and tested each other during thelaunch phase of the activities which began concretely atthe end of 2010. MSF staff provided the 140 prisoners whohad been referred by the prison’s medical services withtreatment in the MSF clinic which was set up just outsidethe prison (140 was the number of prisoners mentionedin the letter of agreement). Conscious of the dangers of its activities being manipula-ted, MSF adopted a special monitoring regime to monitoractivities and negotiations in order to react immediatelyto any problems that were encountered: managementchart of indicators related to working conditions; discus-sion group including experienced people who were notlinked to the running of the project, to regularly review
how the negotiations were progressing; annual visit of theproject, etc.MSF saw the first year as a pilot phase which would ideallylead to AIDS treatment being integrated into the prison’sgeneral healthcare services and genuine co-managementof healthcare. 
ResultsDuring the three years of collaboration, MSF staff achievedsome very positive results:1 401 patients (15 188 consultations in total) receivedtreatment from MSF, 448 of whom received ARV treat-ment in satisfactory working conditions. What is more, theauthorities accepted and respected MSF’s preconditionsduring the whole period in terms of treatment protocols,access and security. In terms of mortality, whereas 49 deaths were recor-ded as being caused by AIDS in 2010, there were 23 in2011, 12 in 2012 and 19 in 2013. The deaths often tookplace when patients were referred to MSF when thedisease was in a very advanced stage. In addition to the medical and psychological consultationsrelated to AIDS, MSF was in charge of opportunisticdiseases, other sexually transmitted diseases, vaccinations(including hepatitis) and referrals to specialist servicesand hospitalisations. Viewed positively by the patients who received treatment,the MSF staff never heard any stories of violence carriedout by the prison staff against one or more prisoners.The relations between MSF staff and the prison authori-ties were cordial, and the coordination meetings tomonitor and manage the problems which arose regularly,proved to be effective. To illustrate this, we will now lookat examples of problems that were dealt with: discrimina-tion against AIDS patients; and providing treatment topatients who had been released from prison and patientswho were from other prisons in Myanmar. Very quickly, the patients who were seen by MSF weresubjected to certain forms of discrimination by other pri-soners and prison staff because they were identified ascarriers of the AIDS virus: everyday tasks were imposedor refused, and they were subjected to baiting and insults.Having been informed of this, the prison authorities hel-ped change this behaviour. Cells were opened forprisoners with AIDS. This measure was imposed by theprison authorities and was appreciated by the patients.Once they were stabilised, the patients were able to goback to their shared cells. Awareness-raising sessions forthe prison’s medical and security staff helped to stop thediscrimination.Contrary to received wisdom, prisons are open spaces, inthe sense that most prisoners end up leaving: either
•  
•  
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because they have served their sentence or because theyhave been granted amnesty. Through negotiation, the MSFstaff were able to get advance notification of the prisoner-patients who were going to be released. Through linkswith medical structures who were able to provide thesepatients with care in their home region (national andinternational NGOs and the Ministry of Health), 86% of theprisoners who were released were successfully referred.At one point, the MSF staff realised that the prisoners whowere sent to their clinic were from other prisons in thecountry, without MSF knowing on what basis these trans-fers were made (in exchange for money ?), and withoutbeing able to follow up these patients. Faced with the riskof becoming the auxiliary of the whole Burmese prisonsystem, and with negotiations still underway to establishthe limits of each party’s responsibilities, MSF decided tooppose this trend through negotiation (from the momentMSF announced its withdrawal, the organisation no lon-ger had any control over this. In total, 25% of the peoplewho died among the large number of people treated byMSF staff came from other prisons than Insein, where notreatment or care for AIDS was available).However, MSF successfully campaigned for women impri-soned for prostitution11 and who were HIV positive to beable to stay in a rehabilitation centre for a return to civi-lian life, where living conditions were much better, ratherthan going to Insein. In the end, the Ministry of Healthaccepted to put in place healthcare for the disease in thisrehabilitation centre. 
Dilemmas and decisionsAll this progress did not allowthree conditions to be met thathad become essential in MSF’sview for the collaboration tocontinue: indiscriminate accessby MSF to all prisoners who nee-ded medical care, the earlydetection of patients with HIVand a real investment by the prison authorities in order tobe able, eventually, to totally fulfil their responsibilitieswith regard to the health of the prison population.Ethically speaking, it was becoming increasingly unbeara-ble to know that though the prisoners who were referredto MSF by the authorities had the right to a quality service,all the other prisoners had to go through the prisonhealthcare system, which was known to be very limited.The negotiations which began at the end of the first yearin favour of a global approach to the prisoners’ healthcame up against a wall of refusal. MSF was never able tointegrate the services it provided to patients with AIDSinto the existing hospital in the heart of the prison, eventhough MSF staff were able to visit it, observe the relativeabsence of patients and propose improvements to the
healthcare provided. The impact in terms of the generalimprovement of health conditions for all the prisonerswas therefore limited. In June 2012, a cholera epidemic broke out in the prison.Officially, around 450 patients and members of the prisonstaff were infected. Fortunately there was only one death.Despite unofficial requests by prison staff and managersto receive assistance from MSF, all offers of services fromthe organisation were officially rejected. This was furtherconfirmation that the collaboration, from the point of viewof the authorities, was just a sub-contracting of services toan external actor kept on the outside… One of the biggest problems that came up in terms of effec-tively treating patients with AIDS was the late detection ofcases, who were usually referred when the disease was inan advanced state. Tests were carried out by the prisonhealth staff, in ethically and qualitatively questionableconditions12. Médecins Sans Frontières’ proposal to sharein providing full medical care for new prisoners, movingtowards joint management of the healthcare, was refusedirreparably. The administration only agreed to delegateresponsibility for carrying out HIV tests to MSF, in the MSFclinic, for all new prisoners that they referred. Though, from the end of the first year of the project (end of2011), discussions between MSF and the prison adminis-tration focused on opening a new phase of partnership forthe benefit of the prisoners, any proposals that were madewith precise content and duration wererejected. So too was real investment bythe authorities to allow them to even-tually take on MSF’s responsibilities.Clearly, and in an increasingly officialway, the objectives and limits of thepartners became clearer… and contra-dictory. The Burmese prison systemwas not planning to begin providinghealthcare for AIDS in prisons and wasonly looking to outsource this activity toan external partner.In June 2013, after more than a year of negotiations, MSFofficially decided to withdraw from the programme, givingthe authorities six months to develop their action plan forthe future. Rapidly, an international NGO (The Union) sta-ted that it was interested in taking over MSF’s activities onthe terms imposed by the authorities. The handover the-refore went as well as could be hoped.
What lessons have been learned?Independently of the success of having treated all thepatients provided with healthcare by Médecins Sans Fron-tières and now by another organisation, as well as all theexperience acquired by the organisation and its staff in
This was further
confirmation that the
collaboration, from the
point of view of the
authorities, was just a
sub-contracting of services
to an external actor kept
on the outside… 
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working in a prison environment, questions remain andthe answers might be different from one organisation toanother: 
Should a programme have been started without all the
conditions having been fixed and codified in advance in a
full agreement to which both parties were tied?For MSF, the question of the long-term sustainability of anoperation or the guarantee of success are not prerequi-sites before launching an operation. In this case, it wasdecided that the conditions for beginning a medical pro-gramme had been met (pilot phase limited to providinghealthcare for AIDS patients, while being open about theobjective of running a global project in due form). Without doubt, in Myanmar perhaps more than anywhereelse, negotiating the conditions of a programme in a pri-son is crucial to maximise the chances of success. The risksinvolved in the programme should be reduced to a mini-mum by investing the necessary means to respond to itsspecific characteristics. 
Is it possible to anticipate and manage the problems and
risks of being manipulated when a programme takes place
at the heart of a repressive dictatorial regime? Unless we consider that prisoners do not deserve toreceive aid like any other human being, it isnatural to envisage a project that respondsto recognised needs. For Médecins SansFrontières, the unacceptable level of morta-lity related to AIDS fully justified theoperation: the cost-benefit ratio clearlyleant towards launching the project.At the same time, the characteristics of theprison environment, regardless of the coun-try, mean that a specific kind of monitoring(of procedures and resources) is necessaryfor this type of project: there are genuinerisks of manipulation13 and participation inthe repression of prisoners – even if this isinvoluntary.The specific tools that were used by MSF for the Inseinproject were not particularly complicated, and could easilybe replicated in other similar contexts.
Can a humanitarian organisation, which conducts pro-
grammes which have a limited timescale, try to reform the
healthcare provided to AIDS patients in a prison environ-
ment (what is more, in Myanmar)?In the end, the issue which caused the most controversywithin the organisation itself was the objective of structu-ral change in the quality of healthcare provision to theprisoners via a short-term project in a prison. Time is amajor factor of success: beyond the slogan, “we cannotknow until we have tried”, which is debatable but is used,it was very important for such a difficult project that theobjectives of the project should have been compatible withthe time given to achieve them.
In this case, there were clear difficulties in establishingworking relations between foreign actors and the Bur-mese authorities and in understanding the reasons why arequest was refused or accepted. Other characteristics,however, provided a counterweight to these unfavourablefactors: the request for action came from the Burmeseauthorities themselves. What is more, they have begun toinclude the treatment of AIDS in their healthcare provisionfor people outside the prison system and Insein has theinfrastructure and medical staff that are needed.   The fact that Médecins sans Frontières’ initial action tookthe form of a pilot phase which only addressed AIDS casesmay have had an ambivalent impact: it allowed MSF toimmediately be effective for the patients while respectingthe conditions of the collaboration with a view to greaterinvestment, but it deprived MSF of a major asset in thenegotiations for a global health project: the authorities’initial request – the provision of healthcare to patientswith AIDS, was immediately satisfied. Why would theythen accept broader collaboration? MSF felt that it wasworth the risk… No doubt Médecins Sans Frontières will run projects inprisons again in the future, given the enormous needs andthe limited number of organisations who are willing orable to do this kind ofwork. The direct impact interms of mortality willcertainly be a major crite-rion behind the decisionto act. Nevertheless, expe-rience shows that theconditions in which theproject are to be imple-mented need to beanalysed in detail and suf-ficient time needs to betaken to make an infor-med decision. Beyond MSF’s involve-ment in the future, given the specific characteristics andchallenges of prison environments, humanitarian andmedical operations in prisons could become a domain (orniche) in which existing experience and expertise could bebrought together in a specific type of service. This couldbe developed within an organisation which is alreadyactive (MSF or other), or via the creation of a new organi-sation.
Jean-Marc Biquet
Researcher, Unité de Recherche sur les Enjeux et les Pratiques
Humanitaires (UREPH), Doctors Without Borders1 “…I got a fairly comprehensive impression of the conditions of detentionaround the world. In many countries I was simply shocked by the way humanbeings are treated in detention. As soon as they are behind bars, detaineeslose most of their human rights and often are simply forgotten by the outsideworld” Extract from the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture andother cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” of 5/2/2010,
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Problems of quality in humanitarian action: what exactly are we
talking about?
Point of view
On 15, 16 and 17 September 2014, at Groupe URD headquarters, the Autumn School on Humanitarian Aid broughttogether specialists on issues of Quality and Accountability. Much is happening in this area, with two important proj-ects being presented in Copenhagen on 12 December 2014: the Core Humanitarian Standard, which has been de-veloped due to the need for greater coherence between the various standards that exist, and the results of theCertification Project led by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response.The key points of the Autumn School will be published on Groupe URD’s website in October . The aim of this arti-cle is not to give a detailed account of the very rich discussions which took place, but rather to talk about a specificissue which was a common theme throughout the discussions: what is the fundamental nature of the problems ofquality in the humanitarian system? And to give Groupe URD’s point of view on these questions.
Different definitions of quality depending on points of viewAgreeing on a definition of quality is not easy in any sector of activity. It is essentially made up of very subjectivecharacteristics and has very different meanings depending on the point of view of the people involved. Attempt-ing to define quality for humanitarian aid, a very complex and multi-party sector, is extremely difficult. At one endof the chain, the people affected by disasters mainly need to have access to assistance which is adapted to their sit-uation and their priorities and which is delivered in a timely manner. At the other end of the chain, donors of coursewant to satisfy these basic needs, but they also have a lot of other pre-occupations such as obeying the policy di-rectives of their governments, ensuring that their operational partners respect administrative and financial regu-lations, and checking their activities in the field. These additional imperatives come from the donor’s role inmanaging public funds and the strong legal constraint in relation to public opinion which comes from having to jus-tify how funds have been spent and what effect this has had.Each stakeholder in the aid system – affected communities and people, local and national authorities, individualdonors, operators, etc. – therefore has their own idea of what a good quality humanitarian operation should be.These different perspectives are also present within humanitarian organizations who have an obligation both tosatisfy the demands of those who fund them and to respond to the needs of disaster-affected people. Tension is com-mon within organizations between, on the one hand, the management who want to consolidate the structure by sat-isfying and reassuring the funding agencies, individual donors and the media, and on the other hand, the operationalstaff who are in contact with the affected people, who are more concerned about the quality and relevance of theoperations in the field.One specific characteristic of the sector comes from the fact that the international aid system is not structured ina way that gives the “beneficiaries” control over the organizations who provide them with assistance. This is a fun-
Julien Carlier & Véronique de Geoffroy 
p. 61. It can be consulted at the following address:http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur/index.htm2 BIQUET J.-M. “Humanitarian work in prisons: the experience of MédecinsSans Frontières” in Humanitarian Aid on the Move, April 2014, pp. 12-15.Available at: http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/URD_HEM_13_EN.pdf3 In its 2000 report on the state of health in the world, the WHO places Myan-mar last in terms of the performance of the health system. Available at:http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/whr00_en.pdf4 Myanmar was rated the most at-risk country in the Asia-Pacific region in2011 by OCHA (see http://www.unocha.org/roap/about-us/about-ocha-roap/myanmar).5 See the report of the International Crisis Group, “Myanmar : The politics ofHumanitarian Aid”, 2/4/2002 disponible sur le site: http://www.crisis-group.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/Myan-mar%20The%20Politics%20of%20Humanitarian%20Aid.pdf6 TERRY F., “Myanmar. Golfing with the Generals” in Humanitarian Negotia-
tions Revealed. Editions Hurst & Company, London, 2011, pp. 109-129.7 Reference to the title of an article about Insein prison which was publishedon 31/5/2009. Accessible at:http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20090531-145075.html
8 In December 2005, the Burmese authorities insisted that a representativeof the State should accompany the ICRC during all visits to prisoners, whichis contrary to the organisation’s practices. As a result, the ICRC suspended itsactivities in prisons (until 2013 when a new agreement was reached on wor-king conditions). See the ICRC press release of 15/3/2007 athttp://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/myanmar-news-150307.htm9 It should be noted that these figures are under-evaluated according even tothe prison staff as terminally ill inmates are often transferred elsewhere atthe last minute to keep the mortality rates at the prision down.10 Title of a book by Laurent Y. « Médecins Sans Frontières, Là où les autresne vont pas » Ed. Robert Laffont, Paris, 1980.11 Anyone charged with prostitution is systematically tested for AIDS. Otherprisoners are only tested if they have symptoms of the disease.12 Tests carried out without consent, and no information about results.13 The project featured in the regime’s propaganda, for example, and the pro-ject allowed the authorities to completely avoid their responsibilities…
